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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Patrick O'Neil appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
O'Neil pied guilty to grand theft by possession. State v. O'Neil, Docket 
No. 38767, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 447, *1 (Idaho App., April 17, 2012). 
The court sentenced O'Neil to a unified sentence of seven years with the first 
three years fixed. ~ O'Neil's judgment of conviction and sentence were 
affirmed on appeal. kL at *2. 
O'Neil filed a pro se petition and affidavit for post-conviction relief 
asserting his trial counsel was ineffective. (R., pp.1-11.) O'Neil also filed a 
motion and affidavit in support for the appointment of post-conviction counsel. 
(R., pp.12-20.) The state filed a general answer to O'Neil's petition for post-
conviction relief. (R., pp.36-41.) The court then filed a notice of intent to dismiss 
O'Neil's petition wherein it denied his request for counsel and gave O'Neil the 
statutory time to respond to its conclusion that O'Neil's claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel were not supported "with any specific facts or other 
admissible evidence." (R., pp.42-57.) O'Neil filed a reply to the court's notice of 
intent to dismiss, resubmitting his previous exhibits and making the same 
arguments he asserted in his petition. (R., pp.58-66.) The court thereafter 
entered an order dismissing O'Neil's petition for post-conviction relief finding 
"there is no evidence, either asserted by the Petitioner or in the record, that 
1 
would demonstrate the Petitioner was subjected to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel." (R., p.72.) 
O'Neil timely appealed. (R., pp.75-78.) 
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ISSUES 
O'Neil states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err by denying Mr. O'Neil's motion for 
appointment of counsel? 
2. Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. O'Neil's petition 
for post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as follows: 
1. Has O'Neil failed to show error in the district court's denial of post-
conviction counsel? 
2. Has O'Neil failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal 




O'Neil Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Request For The Appointment Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
O'Neil asserts on appeal that the court erred in denying his request for 
post-conviction counsel in his petition. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) Because the 
petition did not establish any basis for the appointment of counsel, O'Neil's 
argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-
appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 
682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). The court's discretion is not 
unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts 
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on 
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist 
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. 
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there 
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with 
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the 
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing 
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meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 684, 214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I. C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to 
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for 
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set 
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001) (quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 
102P.3dat1111). 
C. O'Neil Has Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To The Appointment 
Of Post-Conviction Counsel 
O'Neil asserts on appeal that the "district court erred by denying his 
motion for appointment of counsel" because he "raised the possibility of a valid 
claim." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) O'Neil also argues the court erred when it looked 
to the motion for appointment of counsel instead of looking at his petition for 
post-conviction relief itself to determine whether it presented the possibility of a 
valid claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) O'Neil's arguments are unfounded. 
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In analyzing O'Neil's request for the appointment of post-conviction 
counsel, the court cited the correct legal standard (see R., pp.44-46) before 
concluding O'Neil's case was not one "in which counsel should be appointed to 
assist the Petitioner" (R., p.46). Although it appears the court did analyze the 
merits of O'Neil's motion for counsel, such analysis was not in lieu of or to the 
detriment of the analysis of whether O'Neil had asserted the possibility of a valid 
claim. The court specifically stated: 
This Court has once again considered the Petitioner's 
request and explored the record in this case to determine whether 
the facts justify the appointment of counsel. After examining the 
Petitioner's claims, this Court has again determined the Petitioner's 
claims are frivolous. The Petitioner has simply not raised the 
possibility of a valid claim. As such, this Court hereby DENIES the 
Petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel. 
(R., p.71 (capitalization original).) That the court also considered the assertions 
in the motion itself does not show it applied an incorrect legal standard. 
O'Neil also asserts the district court erred because the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims O'Neil asserted "are possibly valid claims." 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) As discussed in Section II of this brief, the frivolous 
nature of the claims in O'Neil's petition for post-conviction relief warrant the 
denial of the request for counsel. 
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11. 
O'Neil Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
The district court provided O'Neil with the opportunity to respond to its 
notice of intent to dismiss and ultimately denied O'Neil's petition for post-
conviction relief on the basis that O'Neil's claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel "did not merit post conviction relief since the Petitioner failed to meet 'his 
burden of demonstrating that his counsel's performance was deficient and that 
he was prejudiced by that deficiency."' (R., p.71 (internal citation omitted).) The 
district court further found that "Mr. O'Neil only offered conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence in support of his allegations." (R., p.71.) 
On appeal, O'Neil reasserts his original claim that counsel was ineffective, 
asserting counsel "entered into a stipulation for restitution without [O'Neil's] 
knowledge and consent" and that "counsel failed to file a motion to suppress." 
(Appellant's brief, p.8 (citation to record omitted).) O'Neil argues his claims for 
ineffective assistance of counsel were supported by more than conclusory 
allegations. (R., pp.9-10.) 
O'Neil's arguments on appeal fail. He has not shown that the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001 ). On appeal from summary 
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dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to 
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely 
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction 
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain 
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing l.R.C.P. 
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. & (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises 
no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. llL. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." & 
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D. O'Neil Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In 
Summarily Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
O'Neil has failed to establish the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. In both its notice of intent to 
dismiss and its order dismissing O'Neil's petition for post-conviction relief, the 
district court articulated the applicable legal standards and sets forth, in detail, 
the reasons O'Neil failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on either of 
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, O'Neil asserted "a restitution 
hearing was set and [he) was not transported to it yet they came to an agreement 
without [him]." (Appellant's brief, p.3.) His counsel, O'Neil asserts, was 
ineffective "for entering into an agreement/stipulation for restitution without [his) 
knowledge or consent." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) O'Neil also claims his counsel 
was ineffective for failing "to file a motion to surpress [sic) or question the legality 
of the search." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) In support of this contention, O'Neil 
attached a portion of a police report to his petition. (R., pp.26-27.) To succeed 
on these claims, O'Neil was required to demonstrate both deficient performance 
and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Although 
O'Neil asserts on appeal that he presented evidence of both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice to fulfill the prongs of Strickland (Appellant's 
brief, pp.9-10), as the court found below, the record does not support O'Neil's 
position. 
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The district court found, in dismissing O'Neil's petition for post-conviction 
relief, O'Neil failed to present evidence deficient performance or prejudice 
resulting from the actions of his attorney. (R., pp.72-73.) The record supports 
this conclusion. 
In support of his allegation that his attorney was ineffective for agreeing to 
restitution without his consent or presence (R., p.3), O'Neil provided the court 
with a partial police report purporting to list property "returned to owner" (R., p.29) 
and a partial transcript in which counsel objected to the state's request for 
restitution (R., p.31 ). These documents do not support O'Neil's blanket assertion 
that his counsel improperly stipulate to restitution. (R., p.60.) Further, O'Neil 
failed to even discuss how the outcome of his case would have been different 
had his attorney not allegedly been ineffective for failing to have O'Neil present at 
a restitution hearing and stipulating to restitution, thereby failing to address the 
prejudice prong of Strickland. 
Although O'Neil makes a bare, unsupported statement regarding the 
ineffectiveness of his attorney for failing to file a motion to suppress (R., p.5), 
O'Neil does not discuss either the deficient performance or prejudice prong as 
they relate to his claim. Although he attached pages six and seven of a police 
report of undetermined length (R., pp.26-27) to his petition for post-conviction 
relief, this report does not support a finding that his attorney was deficient or that 
the outcome of the case would have been different had his attorney filed a 
motion to suppress. 
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Review of the evidence presented by O'Neil in the form of his verified 
petition, accompanying affidavit, and exhibits shows that he did not present 
evidence showing the elements of his claim. His claims did not show deficient 
performance and O'Neil presented no evidence of prejudice. Because he 
presented only conclusory evidence that did not establish his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, O'Neil has failed to show that the district court 
erred by summarily dismissing them. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing O'Neil's petition for post-conviction relief. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of May, 2013, served a true 
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JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
NLS/pm 
12 
